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Abstract 
This article is a comparative analysis of the effects of power structures on the 
success and/or failure of the water regimes in the Jordan River Basin and Euphrates 
Tigris River Basin. In order to see the differences and/or similarities between the 
two river basins, both of which are located in the same geographical region, regime 
theory is taken as the theoretical framework. The article contributes to the research 
on water in the Middle East in two ways: first, it analyses the role of domestic 
powers as well as global and regional powers on regime outcome; and second, it 
provides a basis for understanding why the riparians have chosen cooperative 
strategies in the Jordan Basin while in the Euphrates Tigris region temporary 
resolutions have been chosen. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In most water poor regions, access to water may draw the borderlines for relations 
among regional actors. As fresh water is vital for the livelihood of human beings, 
the struggle for access to and control over water resources has been a major cause of 
tensions among communities. Water that transcends state boundaries may lead to 
further complexities in terms of riparian relations and institutional limitations. The 
vitality of fresh water, accompanied with the water scarcities in water poor regions, 
makes hydro-politics among riparian states one of the most complex issues in 
international relations. 
Given the environmental security dimension of transboundary water issues, two 
different approaches have been used to explain them. On the one hand, some 
scholars like Gleick (1993) and Homer-Dixon (1994) stress the likelihood of violent 
conflicts arising over water resources. On the other hand, scholars like Wolf (1998) 
focus on the likelihood of cooperation over water resources based on empirical 
evidence. As far as empirical records are concerned, in spite of the potential for 
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tensions in shared river basins, the record of acute conflict is overwhelmed by the 
record of cooperation. According to the Oregon State University’s Transboundary 
Freshwater Dispute Database, in the last fifty years, just thirty-seven acute 
conflicts have occurred, while 150 water treaties were negotiated and signed.1 That 
is to say, cooperation rather than conflict is the rule in transboundary water 
relations.  
According to Elhance (1999) when studying conflict or cooperation in river basins, 
a number of factors should be taken into consideration. First of all, the hydrology of 
a river basin paves the way for interdependencies among riparians in terms of 
politics, environment and security. The physical geography is one of the 
denominators that determines the nature and degree of dependence of each riparian 
on the shared river as well as the urgency of the need for cooperation. Although 
states tend to exploit the water resources that flow within their territories, 
hydrological interdependencies in the basin gradually force them to find 
compromised solutions and cooperate over shared waters. In addition to 
hydrological interdependencies, the riparian structure of the basin constitutes 
another important aspect of riparian relations. Within this context, physical 
geography plays a substantial role in defining bargaining powers of the riparians as 
well as their power position in the basin (Elhance 1999). In most cases, upstream 
states exploit the waters of rivers that flow through international borders. Thus, this 
exploitation may negatively affect the quality and quantity of waters available to 
downstream states. Particularly in the absence of a basin wide agreement, upstream 
states can alter the flow and, consequently, downstream states can suffer from low 
levels of quality and quantity of water. In spite of the importance of being upstream, 
the relative power of the riparians also influences hydropolitics in the basin. Thus, 
hegemons in the river systems can play important roles in defining the basics of 
basin wide agreements in favour of their own interests.  
As water is a shared resource and a public good, it must be considered as a common 
property resource which is supplied jointly and which no party within the river basin 
can be excluded access to. But in practice, states are reluctant to share control over 
the rivers that flow within their borders. In order to maximize their gains, states tend 
to exploit transnational water resources unilaterally. States’ unilateral actions in 
international river basins have constituted a challenge for basin wide solutions to 
protect this common property resource and enhance the benefits to all. As 
experienced in the Middle East river basins, scarcity is not the main reason for 
worsening disputes. Rather, unilateral actions such as dam construction or river 
diversion in the absence of an agreement, lead to destabilization of the basin. 
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According to Postel and Wolf (2001:61), “the red flag for water-related tension 
between countries is not water stress per se but rather a unilateral attempt to develop 
an international river, usually by a regional power.” 
The Middle East is one of the most water poor regions and has the world’s lowest 
per capita water consumption. As the climate is largely arid with average annual 
rainfall levels of less than 250 mm/year, annual water supply in the region is not 
reliable. Thus, the region suffers from acute water scarcities. Consequently, 
hydropolitics in the Middle East have been characterized by intense and 
occasionally armed hostility since the second half of the 20th century.  
Until the 1940s the regional economies were regarded as water secure with enough 
water to meet domestic and industrial demands. But parallel with increasing 
population rates, the use of fresh water increased six-fold over half a century.   
Water has therefore become one of the vital security issues among water poor 
Middle Eastern states (Allan 2002). Furthermore, the policy of food security and 
self-reliance as a national economic goal for most of the regional governments has 
caused over use of water in irrigation. Over 70% of water supplies in the region are 
used for irrigation. In spite of the poor economic returns, these agricultural policies 
have been pursued as a primary political objective, making water resources 
extremely valuable for governments. Within this context, for most of the Middle 
Eastern governments national security translates into food security, and food 
security translates into water security (Morris 1997). Therefore, the allocation of 
water resources that transcends boundaries (e.g. Euphrates, Tigris, Nile, Jordan, 
Yarmuk etc.) has become one of the sources of inter-state tensions. The main factors 
that might fuel these water related tensions are: rapidly growing populations, 
economic development, increasing living standards, technological developments, 
political fragmentation and poor water management. These factors, accompanied 
with inadequacy of international water laws, can lead to an escalation of conflict in 
the region over shared water resources (Drake 2000). Most of the riparian 
governments face common water problems which can be either the incentive for 
further tensions or an impetus towards regional cooperation in order to overcome 
political, social and economical problems. Within this context, in spite of the 
growing water demand the Middle East has not experienced any significant war 
over water resources with the exception of some minor military events in the Jordan 
Valley in the early 1960s. 
In this article two of the conflict-prone water basins, Euphrates Tigris and Jordan 
Basins both located in the Middle East, will be examined and compared in order to 
analyze the role of power structures and actors other than the state on water regime 
formations. The overall goal is to analyze the power structures and actors that have 
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affected the regime outcome in two different but overlapping regional river basins. 
Within this context, possible answers to the following questions will be sought:  
In what ways do regime formation outcomes in the Euphrates Tigris and 
Jordan River Basins differ from each other?  
How do global, regional and domestic power structures affect the processes 
and outcomes of water regime formations in the two river basins?  
The first part of the article presents regime theory and regime formation arguments 
as the main theoretical framework. The second part of the article consists of a 
comparative analysis of the cooperative efforts and respective agreements in the 
two river basins. In addition, the role of power structures will be assessed vis-à-vis 
their impacts on water regime formations.  
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES AND WATER REGIMES 
One of the main characteristics of the contemporary globalised international system 
is the high level of interdependence among international actors. Keohane and Nye 
(1989) define situations characterized by reciprocal effects among international 
actors as interdependence in world politics. According to Keohane and Nye, 
interdependence affects state behaviour and policies. Within this context, new 
procedures, rules, or institutions for certain kinds of activity have been created in 
order to regulate and control transnational and interstate relations. In general, these 
cooperative efforts are called international regimes.  
Regime theory provides a tool for explaining international cooperation in the 
presumed anarchic international system. The consensus definition of international 
regime was elaborated by Stephen Krasner and is defined as “sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 
1991:2). According to Krasner (1991) regimes are not regarded as ends in 
themselves; rather they affect related behaviour and outcomes. In an international 
system, based on the idea of sovereign states, the main function of regimes is to 
coordinate state behaviour in order to achieve desired outcomes. Within this context 
the major function of international regimes is to facilitate mutually beneficial 
agreements among governments (Keohane 1991).  
With regard to international watercourses, the concept of water regimes has been 
attracting more and more attention. Water regimes refer to the constrained 
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mechanisms that guide the actions of parties in a river basin (Jagerskog 2001:4). For 
Hafterdorn, water regimes come into existence “when affected states to a conflict 
observe a set of rules designed to reduce conflict caused by use, pollution or 
division of a water resource or the reduction of the standing costs and the 
observance over time of these rules” (Hafterdorn 2000:65). Hafterdorn 
distinguishes between regimes that are established to deal with all future water 
conflicts, like the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, and water regimes that are connected to a particular 
conflict.  
In general, the conceptualisation of international regimes is rooted in the 
conventional definition of international politics and refers to relations between 
sovereign actors who pursue self-preserved policies. Thus, the outcomes emerging 
from the interactions of states, which can range from war to cooperation, are the 
reflections of states’ interests and preferences (Stein 1991). The realist school, 
however, argues that conflict is the dominant outcome in terms of relations among 
self-interested international actors. International regimes are thus an anomaly from 
this standpoint (Keohane 1991). Within this context, the logic and impetuses behind 
the formation of regimes requires examination. 
REGIME FORMATION  
According to Keohane (1991) and Stein (1991), international regime formation 
relies on rational-choice analysis. Stein argues that  
…the same forces of autonomously calculated self-interest that lie at the 
root of the anarchic international system also lay the foundation for 
international regimes. …[T]here are times when rational self-interested 
calculation leads actors to abandon independent decision making in 
favour of joint decision making (Stein 1991:132). 
With this formulation, Stein presumes the existence of interdependence which 
makes mutual expectations very important.  
An international system is characterized by independent self-interested 
decision-making. According to Stein, there is no need for a regime if there is no 
conflict between interests of the states. However, if all the actors have an incentive 
to avoid independent decision-making, self-interested calculations would pave the 
way to joint decision making since independent self-interested behaviour might 
result in undesirable outcomes. Stein defines these situations as dilemmas of 
common interests. According to Stein, in order to solve the dilemma of common 
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interests individual actors have to come together to form an international regime. 
As far as international collective goods are concerned, optimal provision can be 
assured only if states abstain from independent decision-making. Otherwise, 
independent decision-making leads them to be free riders and results in either the 
sub-optimal provision or the non-provision of collective goods (Stein 1991). 
The tragedy of the commons is the best example of the dilemma of common 
interests and the necessary collaboration to move from the sub-optimal equilibrium. 
The commons are open to all and the tragedy is the overgrazing that resulted from 
unrestrained individual use. Each actor most prefers to be the only user of the 
common source, followed by joint restraint in the mutual use of the good, and least 
prefers a situation in which his or her own restraint is met by the others’ lack of 
restraint. Each actor prefers to share the resource rather than to see their own 
restraint allowing either the continued existence of the resource for others’ use or 
the disappearance of the resource because of others’ unrestricted usage. “The actors 
have a common interest in moving from their sub-optimal (but not least preferred) 
outcome to one in which they exercise mutual restraint by collaboratively managing 
the resource” (Stein 1991:129). In a nutshell, regimes arise when actors give up 
independent decision making in order to deal with the dilemmas of common 
interests for the sake of their own self-interests.  
As far as the structural basis of regimes is concerned, the distribution of power 
among relevant actors shapes the structural characteristic of a regime. Young (1991) 
defines three different paths to regime forms: 1) spontaneous, in which regimes 
emerge from converging expectations; 2) negotiated, in which regimes are formed 
by agreements; and 3) imposed, in which regimes are forced by external powers. 
Among these formation shifts, imposed regimes are the most sensitive to shifts in 
the division of power within the international system since they are most closely 
tied with the power structures. 
Regime theory proposes that cooperation will bring better payoffs. However, 
real-world cases of international cooperation cannot be regarded as being initiated 
in a spontaneous manner. Instead, strong leadership tends to initiate international 
cooperation in many cases.  In all types of regime formation, power plays a vital 
role. In many cases, a hegemon plays the role of a "facilitator” for international 
cooperation and works synergistically for better solutions for all member countries 
within the system (Min 2003). Most often, hegemonic powers use their powers to 
sustain a regime that promotes their interests, or they may veto the formation of a 
regime that challenges their interests. In terms of sub-systemic regimes, hegemonic 
powers can structure the choices and preferences of less powerful actors and shape 
regional outcomes.  
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Keohane (1984) takes the concept of benevolent hegemony and incorporates it as 
the starting point of his regime theory. According to Keohane, the hegemon is a 
leader who reinforces cooperation among actors to produce symbiotic effects in 
collective actions. Although he shares the liberal argumentation proposing the 
possibility of non-hegemonic cooperation, his concept of benevolent hegemony is 
inspired by the realist argument of accepting the hegemonic role for maintaining the 
stability of the international system. However, for Keohane hegemony is not a 
sufficient condition for international cooperation. Keohane focuses on state 
decisions rather than on power capabilities and argues that the legitimate nature of 
hegemony is founded upon the consent of non-hegemonic states. According to him, 
hegemony is distinguished by its “willingness to sacrifice tangible short-term 
benefits for intangible long-term gains” (Keohane 1984:45). On the other hand, in 
the coercive version of the hegemonic stability theory, a hegemon is understood as a 
utility-maximizer that coerces or extracts subordinate countries as much as possible. 
One of the major characteristics of coercive hegemony is the hegemon’s forceful 
action toward other countries in the system. Thus, a “rational” hegemon extracts 
available resources from others in addition to providing international public goods 
for systemic purposes (Min 2003). According to Gilpin (1981), states seek optimum 
combinations of power and welfare. Therefore, the systemic behaviour of a 
hegemon or other states can be explained by the expected utility calculated by these 
actors. Furthermore, he argues that international systems are changed by states that 
receive positive expected benefits exceeding expected costs from the change.  
In addition to the influence of hegemons, the power relations among actors within a 
sub-system should be taken into consideration. Both in the formation and 
continuation of a regime, interdependency among actors and the vulnerability of 
actors towards others’ actions within the system also play major roles. In other 
words, both the sub-systemic and global power structures can affect the nature of 
the regime, and the regime in turn governs the political bargaining and 
decision-making within the system (Keohane and Nye 1989). 
In general, regime theory is criticized for neglecting domestic politics. This neglect 
of domestic politics poses limitations for understanding cooperation among 
international actors. In order to understand the reasons behind states’ cooperative or 
non-cooperative actions or policies in the international system, the domestic 
political context needs to be examined since foreign policies are mainly reflections 
of domestic interests. Particularly in security issues, the perceptions of elites play a 
major role while in economic issues, the internal distribution of the costs and 
benefits of international policies plays the major role. Thus, the tendency to ignore 
domestic politics has caused deficiencies in explanations of the security and 
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economic policies of individual states since, in most cases, the internal character of 
states and elites is one of the central elements in determining state preferences.  
Consideration of domestic politics is, hence, essential for understanding 
international cooperation for three reasons: First, domestic politics shows how 
preferences are aggregated and national interests constructed; second, domestic 
politics help to explain the strategies that are adopted by the state in order to realize 
the goals; and third, domestic politics are essential to ratify international agreements 
and cooperation documents (Milner 1992). 
Krasner and Katzenstein (1978) focus on structural factors as domestic 
determinants of foreign policy. Both authors state that central decision-makers (i.e. 
the state) must be concerned simultaneously with domestic and international 
pressures. Furthermore, according to Putnam: 
…a more adequate account of the domestic determinants of foreign policy 
and international relations must stress politics: parties, social classes, 
interest groups (both economic and non-economic), legislators, and even 
public opinion and elections, not simply executive officials and 
institutional arrangements (Putnam 1993:435).  
In light of the importance of domestic politics, Putnam uses the “two-level game” 
metaphor:  
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring 
the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power 
by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, 
national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy 
domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign 
developments (Putnam 1993:436).  
Thus, governments should be in line with their respective domestic interests for 
pursuing international policies. Since regime formation is part of international 
policies of a particular government, as far as regime formation is concerned, 
domestic politics absolutely do matter. In order to explain the interaction between 
domestic politics and regime formation, Zurn takes Krasner’s conceptualisation of 
regimes as “intervening variables” between the “basic causal variables” and “the 
observable related behaviour” and identifies basic causal variables as “domestic 
politics” (Zurn 1993). 
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WATER REGIMES IN THE JORDAN AND EUPHRATES TIGRIS RIVER 
BASINS 
Since the second half of the 1990s, relations between riparians in both the Jordan 
River Basin and the Euphrates River Basin have been dominated by peaceful 
resolution of disputes. This is contrary to the general view that both basins are 
conflict-prone and, therefore, it is likely that water will lead to conflicts. In the 
Jordan Basin agreements for settling water distribution disputes were signed and 
Joint Water Committees (JWC) were initiated. However, in the Euphrates Tigris 
region relations between the Turkish and Syrian governments are getting more 
cooperative and friendly. In the following section, the tendency towards 
cooperation and/or resolution of tensions in the Jordan and the Euphrates Tigris 
River Basins will be analysed within the framework of regime theory.   
Since the independence of the Arab states and the foundation of the State of Israel, 
wars and/or armed conflicts between Arabs and the Israelis have been a part of the 
relations among Jordan riparians. By contrast, among the Euphrates Tigris riparian 
states the only war between riparians was the Iran-Iraq war. 
As opposed to the assumption that freshwater conflicts are the significant 
determinant of riparian tensions, in reality the main reasons behind most of the 
wars/armed conflicts in both river basins are political disputes involving territorial 
disputes, ethnic rivalries, nationalism or regional hegemony. Although water 
security has been considered as an indispensable part of national security by the 
riparian states’ governments, freshwater has not been the only reason for conflicts 
or tensions between riparians in both basins. The only real war over water resources 
was the Six Days War (1967) in the region. In most cases, the impact of political 
tension between riparians is a significant component in freshwater conflict 
escalation, as experienced between Israel and its Arab neighbours since their 
independence.  
In the Euphrates Tigris Basin, water has not been one of the determinants of state 
ideology and, therefore, water related tensions were not experienced between 
riparians in the initial periods of state building in the basin. On the other hand, 
access to water resources was one of the significant determinants of the Zionist 
ideology which paved the way for Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip 
and the Golan Heights to strengthen its hydro-strategic position in the basin. Given 
the importance of the water, especially for Jordan and the Palestinians, Israel’s de 
facto confiscation of water resources has always been a highly contentious and 
tension-ridden issue in the Jordan Basin.   
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In spite of the general assumption that war/armed conflict over water resources is 
inevitable in the Jordan Basin, particularly between Jordan and Israel, there have 
been ongoing efforts since the 1950s to form a kind of water regime between the 
two states. As a result of the interdependence between Jordan and Israel and their 
dependency on water resources, formation of some procedures, rules, or institutions 
was inevitable in order to regulate and control their relations. In this sense, the 
formation of a water regime between Israel and Jordan can be considered as part of 
the rational-choice analysis of the two states, both of which decided to abandon 
independent decision making in favour of joint decision making in accordance with 
their rational self-interested calculations. In spite of the conflictual policies and 
unilateral projects of Jordan and Israel in terms of the water diversion from the 
Yarmouk and Jordan Rivers, with the 1994 Peace Agreement both countries 
accepted that the individually preferred outcome is neither accessible nor stable. 
Therefore, in order to reach an optimal outcome they decided to review their 
dominant strategies.  
The case of Jordan and Israel may be considered as a water regime created to solve 
the dilemma of common interests. As regimes established to deal with the dilemma 
of common interests require collaboration, the water regime between Israel and 
Jordan specifies the rules for allocation, storage and protection within the Annex II 
of the Israel Jordan Peace Treaty.2 Furthermore, as a part of collaboration efforts, a 
JWC was formed in order to implement and monitor the principles agreed upon. In 
spite of agreement on the principles with regard to common water resources, the 
regime has been limited in its effectiveness due to political disputes between Israel 
and Jordan that have forced them into non-compliance of these rules at times 
(Jagerskog 2003). 
Although control over and access to water resources is one of the basic conflictual 
issues between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, it was the first issue agreed 
upon by the two conflicting parties. Since the establishment of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) Palestine has not been recognized as a state, which 
caused Israel and Jordan’s rejection of Palestine as a co-riparian. Until the 1995 
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, 3  Palestinians were considered as a 
population under the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 
spite of the Palestinian Authority’s claims on water rights within the framework of 
the principle of the absolute territorial sovereignty. Unlike its equal position with 
Jordan as a sovereign state, in the Palestinian case, Israel is considered as the owner 
                                              
2 Treaty of Peace Between The State Of Israel And The Hashemite Kingdom Of Jordan (1994) Available from: 
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa.go.asp?MFAH00pa0>. 
3  The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (1995) Available from: 
<http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Peace/iaannex3.html#app-40>. 
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and the provider of water supplies for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. At the 
beginning of the negotiation process, both Israel and Palestine started with 
contradictory claims and assumptions on the water issue. However, during the 
negotiations both sides compromised their claims and, by the end, found an optimal 
point for agreement even though this did not serve all their self-interested demands. 
In spite of its favourable position, Israel was forced to agree on an optimum 
resolution over the water issue, which is an integral part of the interim agreement 
within the framework of the Middle East Peace Process initiated by the United 
States. By signing the interim agreement, Israel accepted the Palestinians’ water 
rights to some reasonable degree. In order to facilitate the water allocation issues 
and water related projects and improve the efficiency of water systems especially in 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a JWC was established between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority. Despite some exogenous challenges and a slow 
decision-making mechanism, the cooperation has continued (Jagerskog 2003).  
In both cases, there is a power asymmetry between the sides. According to Keohane 
and Nye (1989), asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of bargaining power 
in favour of the ones who have control over resources or the potential to affect 
outcomes. As experienced in the negotiations between Jordan and Israel, Jordan 
was not in a strong position with regards to control over water. As a result, Jordan 
tended to negotiate with Israel in order to guarantee an optimum share and to 
prevent further conflicts with Israel. On the other hand, as a less dependent and 
more powerful actor, Israel was the leading actor during negotiation. Because of 
this, any changes in the existing regime will most likely be less costly for Israel than 
Jordan. As far as Palestine is concerned, although it is the weakest actor in the basin, 
during negotiations Palestine had the international community’s support for its case 
against Israel. However, changes in the existing regime will more likely cause 
significant harm to the Palestinians since Israel still has the power to control water 
supplies in the Palestinian settlements. 
Compared with the Jordan Basin, in the Euphrates Tigris Basin no significant 
tensions have been experienced apart from some diplomatic tensions or verbal 
threats, since none of the riparians are as vulnerable in terms of water shortage. The 
conflicts in both basins are mainly distributional conflicts. However, the main 
reason for tensions in the Jordan Basin is absolute shortage, whereas in the 
Euphrates Tigris it is relative shortage (Hafterdorn 2000). Major tensions among 
riparians started with the unilateral dam construction projects of Turkey and Syria. 
Turkey’s Greater Anatolia Project (GAP)4 was perceived by Syria and Iraq as a 
                                              
4 Since the late 1960s, Turkish governments have initiated a series of water development projects in the Southeast 
Anatolia region known as the Greater Anatolia Project (GAP). After the 1980s, the GAP transformed from a 
largely hydroelectric project to an integrated regional development program. The GAP is a multi-sector and 
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threat to their water quantity and quality – Syria was accused by Iraq of reducing 
waters as a result of the Al Thawra Dam. The tensions between Iraq and Syria were 
not long lasting, whereas the tensions between Turkey on the one hand and Iraq and 
Syria on the other continued until the end of the 1990s. Recently the tensions among 
riparians have been simply frozen. Thus, it is likely to exacerbate new tensions. Iran 
has generally stayed out of the basin-wide tensions and resolution efforts because of 
its water-sufficient position and its regional marginalization.  
Unlike the Jordan Basin, in the Euphrates Tigris there are no stable alliances among 
riparians. In the basin, alliances among riparians have been contingently formed. 
These unreliable alliances and lack of trust among riparians has prevented the 
formation of a water regime in any real sense in the basin. As opposed to the 
Israel-Jordan and Israel-Palestine cases, until now no water regime has formed 
between the Euphrates Tigris riparians. Attempts have been made to resolve water 
related tensions and disputes between Turkey-Syria and Turkey-Iraq through 
bilateral agreements as well as Turkey’s unilateral initiatives to release more water 
in order to prevent accusations and ensure international financing in building its 
dams as experienced in 1965 (Keban Dam), 1976 (Karakaya Dam) and 1990 
(Ataturk Dam). 
In spite of the formation of the Joint Technical Committee (JTC), this committee 
and its agreements cannot go beyond data sharing and water allocation discussions. 
In this respect, the agreements between Turkey-Syria or between Syria-Iraq are just 
“one-shot” agreements with no regime in place to facilitate these arrangements. 
According to Keohane and Nye (1989), regime governed behaviour must be beyond 
short-term interests. In order to establish a regime, states should accept reciprocity 
and sacrifice short-term interests with the expectation that other actors will 
reciprocate in the future. Within this context, the only possibility for a regime 
formation would be if Syria and Iraq accepted Turkey’s Three Staged Plan.5 But 
neither Syria nor Iraq is inclined to accept the plan since the logic behind the plan is 
not compatible with their claims.  
                                                                                                                                                           
integrated regional development program that encompasses irrigation, hydraulic energy, agriculture, rural and 
urban infrastructure, forestry, education and health sectors. The water resources development dimension of the 
project consists of the construction of twenty-two dams and nineteen hydraulic power plants as well as the 
irrigation of 1.7 million hectares of land. In this regard, some of the basic strategies of the project are 
environmental protection, employment generation, spatial planning and infrastructure development (GAP 
Administration 2002). 
5 This plan is Turkey’s proposal for optimisation of the use of freshwater resources based on the ideas of integrated 
development and management of an international watercourse system for the maximum possible benefit for all the 
riparian states. 
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The main reason behind the failure of the formation of a water regime between the 
Euphrates Tigris riparians is that water scarcity in the Basin is not so acute and 
riparians are not below water stress limits like the Jordan Basin riparians. As a result 
of the relative abundance of renewable water resources compared to the Jordan 
Basin, the significant consequences of “the tragedy of commons” have not been felt 
yet. Therefore, the riparians have not felt any urgency to form a water regime in 
order to improve water resources collectively or agree upon efficient ways of using 
the water resources. Still, self-interested policies overwhelm the collective goods 
and sustainability.  
POWER STRUCTURES IN THE WATER REGIME: FORMATIONS OF THE 
JORDAN AND EUPHRATES TIGRIS BASINS 
According to Keohane and Nye (1989), regimes are intermediating factors between 
international power structures and political bargaining. Thus, both the failure or 
success and the nature of the regime are affected by the structure of the system and 
the distribution of power among states. Furthermore, as far as regimes are 
concerned, the perceptions of elites and the internal distribution of costs and 
benefits of international policies play significant roles both in the formation and 
continuation of the regime.  Thus, domestic politics is essential for understanding 
cooperation among international actors.  
Even though cooperation will bring better payoffs for the relevant actors, 
cooperation among international actors cannot be initiated in a spontaneous manner. 
In most cases of regime formation, a powerful regional actor or global hegemon 
takes on a facilitator role for international cooperation and regime formation.  
The Middle East has always been one of the regions that grabs the global hegemon’s 
attention. Especially after the end of the Cold War within the context of a new 
international order project promoted by the United States, the region has started to 
gain importance. In accordance with the assessments and contingency plans of the 
region, US policies have focused on the Persian Gulf due to the largest recoverable 
deposits of crude oil in the region. As a result of its importance for the US economy, 
the United States has engaged with the region through two channels: initiating the 
Middle East Peace Process between the Arabs and the Israelis; and pursuing a 
containment policy towards Iraq and Iran, as both countries have posed threats to 
US interests in the region.  
In the region which covers all the Jordan and Euphrates Tigris riparians, the United 
States has used its powers in two different directions in terms of regime formations. 
On the one hand, while it has maintained pro-Israel policies and its general support 
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of Israel before the international community, since the 1990s the United States has 
used its power to form water regimes in the Jordan Basin as a part of the peace 
process. On the other hand, it has pursued policies of divide and rule among the 
Euphrates Tigris Basin riparians which have prevented cooperation over the water 
resources. This is in contrast to Keohane’s assumption (1984) that the hegemon is a 
leader who reinforces cooperation among countries to produce symbiotic effects in 
collective actions. In order to contain the Iraqi threat to maximizing its utility in 
terms of regional oil resources, the United States has coerced Turkey and Syria as 
well as other regional states in the region to take a stand against Iraq under the 
banner of providing regional stability and security for the sake of the international 
system. However, unlike its coercive policies in the Euphrates Tigris Basin, in the 
Jordan Basin the United States has pursued more benevolent policies based upon 
the consent of non-hegemonic states as experienced during the negotiations. In this 
sense, the hegemonic intervention for the formation of the water regimes between 
Jordan and Israel and between Israel and the Interim Palestinian Authority was 
significantly important in addition to the riparians’ own consent to the agreement as 
a reflection of the rational choices of all three riparians.  
In addition to the effects of global power structure in terms of the hegemonic 
power’s influence on the formation of the water regimes, the power relations among 
actors within the river basins should be taken into consideration. According to 
Keohane and Nye (1989), both in the formation and continuation of a regime 
interdependency among actors and the vulnerability of actors towards others’ 
actions within the system also play major roles. Physical geography plays a 
substantial role in defining bargaining powers of the riparians as well as their power 
position in the basin. However, in addition to the importance of being the upstream 
riparian the relative power of the riparians also influences the hydropolitics in the 
basin.  
In the Euphrates Tigris Basin among Syria, Iraq and Turkey, Turkey is the most 
powerful country both in terms of control over water resources and in terms of 
political and military power. Turkey’s close alliance with the United States as a 
NATO member has been a protection shield against possible threats from its eastern 
neighbours. Even during its conflict with Kurdish separatist groups, tensions with 
Syria or Iraq never turned into armed conflicts as a result of Turkey’s relative 
military power and alliance with the United States. As for Iraq, since the Iran-Iraq 
war, Iraq’s military power has been deprived and, as a result of ongoing wars, Iraq’s 
water systems and infrastructure have been severely damaged. Furthermore, after 
the “Operation Iraqi Freedom” the Iraqi government lost sovereignty over its 
national resources including water. Until elections are held, an interim government 
rules the country but major projects for improving natural resources are mainly 
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coordinated by the coalition powers. Moreover, with the GAP project, Syria and 
Iraq are alienated from Turkey. Thus, the GAP has left them in a relatively weak 
position. As a result, Iraq has felt that it is at the mercy of Turkey and Syria, both of 
which have the power to prevent Iraq from obtaining enough water. Syria also has 
felt uneasy since, once Turkey completes the GAP, it will have power over both its 
neighbours thereby putting Syria in a merciful position. As a result of this 
asymmetrical power structure, Syria and Iraq have pursued non-cooperative 
policies and rejected Turkish proposals for unitary management of the Basin, 
thereby preventing the formation of a water regime in the Basin.   
By contrast, in the Jordan Basin, Israel is in the most favourable position even 
though it is a downstream riparian. As previously mentioned, by occupying the 
Golan Heights and the West Bank, Israel strengthened its hydro-strategic position in 
the region and has the uppermost position thanks to its military power. Furthermore, 
as a result of its economic power, Israel is able to implement projects for water 
resources development, whereas other economically weak riparians have 
difficulties finalizing their projects with regards to efficiency of water resources. On 
the other hand, their lack of ability to finance water development projects together 
with Israel’s economic power can stimulate development of multilateral projects on 
the shared rivers. Overall in the Jordan Basin, as a result of the powerful position of 
Israel and vulnerable position of Jordan and Palestine, Israel has played a leading 
role in defining the basics of the water regimes both with Jordan and Palestine.  
The most interesting commonality between Turkey and Israel is their close alliances 
with the United States, although their power positions with the United States are 
slightly different in terms of bargaining power. Israel has more bargaining power 
with the US because of the existence of a powerful Jewish lobby in the United 
States, whereas Turkey is more like a follower in terms of its relations with the 
United States. However, Israel’s and Turkey’s power positions in the region differ 
vis-à-vis the international communities’ perceptions. In the Jordan River Basin, 
Israel has been perceived as an “occupier” and has been accused of pursuing hostile 
policies toward its Arab neighbours, particularly toward Palestinians. On the other 
hand, in the Euphrates Tigris Basin, Iraq, Iran and Syria have been labelled as rough 
states particularly by the United States. Of the three, only Turkey is regarded as a 
state respectful of international norms and rules.  The US policies against Iraq, Iran 
and Syria, including embargoes on all three countries and operations against Iraq, 
have caused marginalisation of the three riparians and led to serious damages to the 
relations among the Euphrates Tigris Basin riparians, not only in terms of water 
regime formation but all kinds of cooperation efforts in the Basin.   
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In addition to regional power structures, domestic determinants of foreign policy 
are also among the significant dimensions of regime formation in both Basins. As 
far as the Jordan and Euphrates Tigris Basins are concerned, state characteristics 
and government structures in both basins have repercussions on riparian policies 
with regard to water resources. In both basins, most of the riparian states have 
authoritative governments except Turkey and Israel which have relatively populist 
regimes and democratically elected governments. As a consequence of the 
democratic system, popularity of the policies is more important for the Turkish and 
Israeli governments than for the authoritarian governments of the other riparians. 
However, interest groups are an integral part of political life for all riparians 
whether they are authoritarian or not. Thus, interest groups create some impact on 
policy decisions of all riparian states with regard to water resources.   
In the Turkish case, one of the main reasons behind the unilateral implementation of 
the GAP (a move that prevents water regime formation in the Basin) in spite of other 
riparian’s objections, is the interests of the political elite seeking popular support for 
their political rule. Therefore, the GAP serves the electoral purposes of the ruling 
parties. According to Carkoglu and Eder, the GAP has a political rationale with two 
dimensions:  
…the first is the political potential that the region offers for parties to 
utilize the traditional patronage linkages in implementation of the project 
in order to mobilize electoral support behind the parties in power. The 
second concerns national security and integration of the region to the rest 
of the country (Carkoglu and Eder 2001:51). 
Furthermore, as previously discussed, the GAP is a very significant project for 
Turkey because of the government’s long-term expectation that by implementing 
this huge development project it will be able to resolve the social and economic 
basis of the “Kurdish Problem” in the region. Evidently, both dimensions reveal a 
preoccupation with domestic political concerns even though the second one relates 
to international interactions within the framework of national security. Within this 
context, the political rationale behind the project has been influential on Turkey’s 
relations with Syria and Iraq.  
For Israel, domestic interest groups have been playing significant roles. On the one 
hand, settlers and right wing political parties have influenced Israeli arguments over 
water allocation issues with Jordan and Palestine during negotiation processes in 
order to prevent the Israeli government from completely withdrawing from the 
occupied territories without guaranteeing secure and adequate freshwater sources 
for Israel (Elhance 1999). On the other hand, as far as the Israeli government’s 
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internal policies with regard to water allocation from the agricultural sector to 
industrial and domestic sectors are concerned, the policies can be implemented 
easier now than in the previous period, since the political influence of the 
agriculture and irrigation lobbies have been declining substantially. In Israel, 
interest groups must be taken into consideration both in terms of national water 
policies such as reducing water allocation to agriculture, introduction of strict 
cost-based water-pricing policies for irrigation etc., and in terms of foreign policies 
with regard to hydropolitics.  
In spite of the relative power of authoritarian governments, interests groups, 
particularly bureaucrats and farmers, can be very influential on national water 
policies especially in Jordan and Syria.  Given the importance of agriculture for 
state economies, in Jordan and in Syria water charges are mainly maintained at low 
levels in order to diminish costs in the agriculture sector. However, the need for 
water policy reform in both states, which includes re-allocation of water from 
irrigated agriculture to industry in order to improve economic efficiency, has caused 
some social problems. Demand management, including population growth control, 
economic restructuring, supply redistribution and water conservation techniques, is 
needed for both Syria and Jordan. But as for Syria, the value of agriculture is beyond 
its economic value. As stated by Naff (1994)6 agriculture is culturally embedded, 
highly symbolic, and politically and militarily significant in Syria as in many other 
developing countries. Within this context, it is not easy to implement radical 
demand management policies in Syria and Jordan in spite of the power of the 
governments.  
Unlike Turkey and Israel, domestic interests groups in Syria and Jordan are not so 
influential on the governments’ foreign policies with regard to water regimes. The 
only probable link with domestic interests and the water related policies of the state 
vis-à-vis their relations with Israel is the given importance of food security and the 
importance of water resources for irrigated agriculture. Within this context, it may 
be presumed that agricultural interests are among the main denominators of the 
national water policies of these states.    
As far as Iraq is concerned, under the Ba’th regime national security issues and 
political interests of the state elites overwhelmed the interests of lesser groups as 
evidenced in the drainage of marshlands. The Iraqi government simply ignored the 
importance of the marshlands for the livelihood of Marsh Arabs, who had no power 
to oppose this project, and implemented the drainage project.  
                                              
6 Naff as quoted by Marwa Doudy (1999-2000: Web document). 
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Both in the Jordan and the Euphrates Tigris cases, different domestic power 
structures have impacts on hydropolitics and water regime formation in the basins 
in different forms. For the most part, riparian governments and their policies are 
more or less in line with their respective domestic interests.  
As far as water regime formations are concerned, all riparian states of the two 
Basins have proved Putnam’s two-level game metaphor. On the one hand, at the 
national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring their 
governments to adopt favourable water policies, and politicians in turn seek power 
by satisfying their needs. On the other hand, national governments seek to 
maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures while minimizing the 
adverse consequences of water regime formations.  
CONCLUSION 
This article began with the assumption that water regime formation is not a 
spontaneous process despite the obvious advantages and better payoffs of 
cooperation for the riparians. In order to initiate the formation of a regime, a 
facilitator or strong leadership is needed. The main stimulus behind the positive 
outcomes of the Israeli-Jordan and Israeli-Palestinian agreements over water 
allocation issues was the role of the US as a benevolent hegemon and “facilitator” 
for the resolution of conflicts among the riparians.  At the same time, the main 
obstacle for water regime formation in the Euphrates Tigris is the US as a coercive 
hegemon. In both cases, the US as global hegemon has structured the choices and 
preferences of the riparians and shaped regional outcomes, but in different ways.  
A second assumption with regard to the role of global and regional power structures 
on water regimes was that the country positioned upstream in the basin could be 
more influential on hydropolitics. However, in addition to the importance of being 
upstream the relative power of the riparians in the region was also seen to be a 
significant denominator. Moreover, both Turkey’s and Israel’s relations and close 
alliances with the US must be taken into consideration when evaluating their 
dominant positions in the Basins. It can therefore be proposed that when evaluating 
the role of power structures in regime formation, the relevant actors’ relations with 
the hegemon vis-à-vis the hegemon’s perception of each actor must also be 
considered.  
In sum, the argument that power both global and regional plays a vital role in all 
types of regime formation was illustrated in both cases. However, Keohane’s 
assumption of the benevolent hegemon was challenged by the Euphrates Tigris case 
where the hegemon was shown to be coercive.  
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As regime theory’s neglect of domestic politics poses limitation for understanding 
cooperation among international actors, this article considered domestic interests 
and their effects on decision making in water regime formation in order to more 
fully understand the reasons behind states’ cooperative or non-cooperative actions 
or policies in the international system. 
The role of domestic influences on the outcomes of cooperative efforts and conflict 
resolutions were analysed in the Jordan and Euphrates Tigris Basins. Within this 
context the general assumption was that domestic actors, like NGOs, firms, elites 
and so on, have influence on governments’ decisions with regard to water regime 
formations. However, throughout the research, no evidence of any significant 
influence by NGOs or the business sector could be found. This is because in most of 
the riparian states the water sector is coordinated by the State, and civil society is 
not very powerful in comparison to the State. It was shown that domestic pressures 
come mainly from political elites who want to strengthen their power to rule, and 
from farming interest groups considered to be at the foundation of the national 
economies of most of the riparian states. Besides the general argumentation on the 
role of domestic politics, it is also worth noting that government regime types also 
have significant repercussions on regime formation. However overall, both the 
Jordan River Basin and the Euphrates Tigris River Basin cases prove Putnam’s 
two-level game metaphor, which puts emphasis on the role of domestic group 
interests on government policies and actions with regard to regime outcome.  
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